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CASE NOTES

AGENCY-COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND
PATIENT WITHIN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Defendant brought a mandamus action to compel the trial court in his
personal injury action to order a physician consulted by plaintiff to testify.
Plaintiff claims the communications are privileged as confidential. The
Supreme Court of California held that since the injured party consulted
the physician at the request of his attorneys for the purpose of informing
them of the nature and extent of his injuries, the physician was in fact an
agent of the attorneys and a sub-agent of the injured party and the communications made to him were privileged under the attorney-client relationship. The City and County of San Franciscov. Superior Court, 231 P.
2d 26 (Cal., 1951).
Plaintiff had also contended that the communications came within the
physician-patient privilege but the California Supreme Court held that no
such relationship existed.
The concept that communications between physician and patient are
privileged as confidential did not exist at common law 1 and, thus, in the
states where it does exist, it is only by statute. The general rule in jurisdictions having such statutes is that where a physician or surgeon is consulted for the purpose of examination only, and not for treatment, communications made to him, in the course of such examinations, are not
privileged. 2 The confidence that is protected is only that which is given
to a professional physician during a consultation with a view to curative
treatment; for it is that relation which the law desires to facilitate. 8 Thus,
although California has a statute creating the physician-patient privilege,
a mere examination without treatment or advice of some sort is not sufficient to establish that relationship which is required before the privilege
attaches to the communications of the parties. Also, under the California
statute, the institution of the suit by the injured party would have constituted a waiver of the privilege had it existed. 4 The purpose of these
IWimberly v. State, 217 Ark. 130, zz8 S.W. 2d 991 0950); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Newman, 311 Mich. 368, 18 N.W. 2d 859 (1945); Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679, 4
So. zd 311 (1941); Frederick v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App. ad 585, S7 P. ad
235 (1936).
2

Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Bergeron, 75 F. ad 68o (C.A. 8th, 1928),
cert. denied 278 U.S. 638 (1928); State v. Fouquette, 221 P. ad 404 (Nev., 1950);
McGinty v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, 166 Wis. 83, 164 N.W. 249 (1917);
McMillen v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 68 Ohio App. 459, 37 N.E. ad 632 (1941).
3 In re Baird's Estate, 173 Cal. 617, i6o Pac. 1078 (1916); People v. Dutton, 62 Cal.
App. ad 862, 145 P. zd 676 (944); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § z38z ( 3rd. ed., 194o).
4 Cal. Code of Civil Procedure 0949) § 1881 (4).
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statutes is to conform to the physician's ethical canon of secrecy, on the
theory that the personal privacy of the patient's body is entitled to be
respected. 5 However, when the patient brings a suit in which he must
prove his injuries and make his ailments known to the public, the privilege
no longer has any foundation and its should properly be presumed to
6
be waived.
In holding that the physician was an agent of the plaintiff's attorneys
and a sub-agent of the plaintiff, and that the communication thus came
within the attorney-client privilege, the California court advanced a theory
which has not yet been adjudicated in Illinois. In general, any communication made by a client to his attorney in the course of his professional employment is privileged, provided it is not made in the presence of third
persons other than the attorney's secretary or clerk.' In addition, the
client's freedom of communication requires a liberty of employing other
means than his own personal action, and communications between an attorney and the agent of his client are thus entitled to the same protection
from disclosure as those passing directly between the attorney and his
client.8 This includes communications through an interpreter9 and also
communications through a messenger or any other agent of transmission,
as well as communications originating with the client's agent and made to
the attorney.1 0 It follows that communications of the attorney's agent to
the attorney are within the privilege because the attorney's agent is also
the client's sub-agent and is acting as such for the client.11
The important thing is that the use of an agent be reasonably necessary
to facilitate the communication between the client and the attorney. In
Lala7nce and Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 12 a communica-

tion between an attorney and a scientific expert employed by the client to
5 Wimberly v. State, 217 Ark. 130, 228 S.W. 2d 991 (395o); Williams v. State, 65
Okla. 336, 86 P. 2d 1015 (1939); Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walters, 18o Miss. 384,
177 So. 47 (1937); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 238o(a) (3 rd. ed., 194o).
6
Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 28 Cal. 2d 357, 170 P. 2d 465 (1946); Phillips
v. Powell, 2io Cal. 39, 290 Pac. 441 (1930); Moreno v. New Guadalupe Mining Co.,
35 Cal. App. 744, 170 Pac. io88 (1938); 8 WVigmore, Evidence S 238o(a) (3rd. ed.,

1940).

Doyle v. Reeves, 112 Conn. 521, 52 At. 88z (1931); In re Busse, 322 I11.App. 258,
75 N.E. ad 36 (1947); State v. Loponio, 85 N.J.L. 357, 88 At. 1045 (S. Ct., 1913).
8 Becher v. U.S., 5 F. ad 45 (C.A. ad, 1924), cert. denied 267 U.S. 6o2 (1925); Foley
7

v. Poshke, 137 Ohio St. 593, 31 N.E. 2d 845 (394i); Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal
214 Cal. 182, 4 P. 2d 532 (1931); Le Long v. Siebrecht, 196 App. Div. 74, 187
N.Y.S. 15o (ig2).

Co.,
9

Maas v. Bloch, 7 Ind. 202 (1885).
10 8 Wigmore, Evidence S 2317 (3rd. ed., 1940).

"1Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P. 2d 532 (1931); 8 Wigmore, Evidence S 2317 ( 3rd. ed., 194).
12 87 Fed. 563 (S.D. N.Y., 1898).
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assist in the presentation of the case was held to be privileged. In State v.
Loponio,13 the defendant, who was unable to write, employed another to
write a letter to his attorney and the communication was held to be privileged. Also, communications made to an attorney in the presence of his
clerk and stenographers do not come within the general rule that communications made in the presence of third persons are not privileged because the use of these agents is indispensable to the attorney's work.
In a situation such as the one here presented, it is definitely necessary to
employ the agency of a physician to interpret the injured person's symptoms and conditions and determine the nature and extent of his injuries.
Without such an examination a person cannot adequately pursue his remedy at law. Insurance companies will not consider the settlement or payment of a claim without a medical report.
Thus, in jurisdictions, such as Illinois, which do not have statutes creating the physician-patient privilege, communications made to a physician
may come within the attorney-client relationship and be privileged as confidential. The attorney-client privilege does not depend on a statute for
its existence as it is one recognized by common law and protected
throughout the United States. It would seem to be a useless right if agents
of the client and the attorney, necessarily employed by them, did not come
within the privilege. It would confuse the client and hamper the ends of
justice if only certain agents of the client or attorney were protected; the
client would be hesitant to entrust any agent with information for fear it
could be brought out in open court to his detriment. Therefore, the mere
fact that a state does not have a statute creating a physician-patient privilege should not prevent communications made to a physician from being
privileged under the attorney-client relationship where it is necessary to
employ such an agent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Plaintiffs sought to enforce racial restrictive covenants against white
sellers and negro purchasers of restricted land. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma ruled that a state court could not enforce racial restrictive
agreements in such a way as to work a forfeiture of land validly purchased
by these restricted parties. However, the court said that a state court could
enforce an action for damages against the defendants because they had
conspired to evade these covenants. Correll v. Early, z37 P. zd 1017
(Okla., 1951).

In Sbelley v. Kraemer,' the landmark case in regard to racial restrictive
13 85 N.J.L. 357, 88 Ad. 1045 (S. Ct., 1913).
1334 U.S. 1 (1948).

